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Abstract
We investigate the effect of higher education on the evolution of inequality. In
so doing we propose a novel overlapping generations model with three social classes:
the rich, the middle class, and the poor. We show that there is an initial phase in
which no social class invests in higher education of their children such that inequality
is driven by bequests. Once a certain income threshold is surpassed, the rich start to
invest in higher education of their children, which partially crowds out bequests and
thereby reduces income inequality and inheritance flows in the short run. The better
educated children of the rich, however, enjoy higher incomes such that inequality starts
to rise again. As time goes by, the middle class and potentially also the poor start
to invest in higher education. As the economy proceeds toward a balanced growth
path, educational differences between social groups and thus inequality decline again.
We argue that (1) the proposed mechanism has the potential to explain the U-shaped
evolution of income inequality and inheritance flows in rich countries as well as the
differential investments in higher education by richer and poorer households, (2) the
currently observed increase in inequality is likely to level off in the future.
JEL classification: I23, I24, I25, O11, O41.
Keywords: Higher education, inequality, growth regime switch, middle income trap,
Piketty curve.
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The main force pushing toward reduction in inequality has always been the diffusion of
knowledge and the diffusion of education.
(Thomas Piketty)
1 Introduction
The most salient features of the evolution of income inequality and inheritance flows in
industrialized countries throughout the last century are i) relatively high income inequality
and high inheritance flows as a share of total income at the beginning of the 20th Century;
ii) a substantial drop of both variables after World War II; iii) a relatively constant level
throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, i.e., for around one generation; and vi) strongly
rising income inequality and inheritance flows thereafter (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty
and Saez, 2003; Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2015; Alvaredo et al., 2015). This
pattern is depicted for the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom in Figure
1 as the evolution of the top 10% income share.1 Many explanations for this pattern
have been proposed: the disruptions of World War II had a negative impact on wealth,
while substantial inheritance taxes and high marginal income tax rates in the period 1950-
1970 exacerbated the drop in inequality and in inheritance flows after World War II. As
far as the increase in inequality and in inheritance flows from the late 1980s onwards is
concerned, potential explanations range from decreases in marginal income tax rates and
inheritance taxes (particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom), via skill-
biased technological change, which disproportionately benefited the well-educated, to a
decrease in population growth, which increased the concentration of bequests, and finally
to globalization, which put pressure on low incomes because low-skilled labor intensive
production has often been outsourced to low-wage countries (see Acemoglu, 2002; Elsby
et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014, for different arguments).
We propose a complementary mechanism that provides a candidate explanation for the
joint U-shaped evolution of income inequality and inheritance flows throughout the 20th
Century. The central driving force is the increase in costly higher education after World
War II, where the most wealthy groups were the first to be able to invest massively in
higher education of their children. This slows down intergenerational wealth accumulation
among the rich because household’s resources are re-allocated away from bequests (physical
capital accumulation) toward higher education (human capital accumulation). The fact
that a substantial amount of time elapses between education and labor market entry
implies that inheritance flows and income inequality are reduced for a certain amount
of time (cf. Piketty, 2014; Alvaredo et al., 2015). However, the increase in the skills of
the children of the rich raises their income once that they enter the labor market leading
to a steeper age-income profile later on in their lives. Consequently, after around one
1The U-shaped evolution of inheritances for Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States is documented in Alvaredo et al. (2015) and for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in
Piketty and Zucman (2015).
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Figure 1: Share of total income of the richest 10% in the United States, Germany and the
United Kingdom (excluding capital gains).
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generation, income inequality starts to rise again. We show that our mechanism has the
potential to explain (part of) the observed evolution of income inequality and inheritance
flows in industrialized countries in the second half of the 20th Century and in the first
decade of the 21st Century.
The increase in the importance of higher education on which our model relies is highly
visible in the data for the United States and the timing coincides with the timing that
our model implies: While in 1940 only 4.6% of the population above the age of 25 had a
college degree, 32% did so in the year 2015 (United States Census Bureau, 2015). As far
as the joint evolution of income inequality and higher educational attainment between the
different income groups is concerned, the predicted pattern of our model is also consistent
with the data as reported by The Pell Institute (2015). They show that in 1970, 40% of
the dependent members of families in the top income quartile had a Bachelor’s degree by
the age of 24. This number almost doubled to 77% in 2013. In the second highest income
quartile, 15% of dependent family members had a Bachelor’s degree in 1970, which more
than doubled to 34% in 2013. In the lowest income quartile, however, only 6% of the
dependent family members had a Bachelor’s degree in 1970 and the number barely rose
over time to 9% in 2013.
We conceptualize the outlined mechanism by assuming that there are three social
classes, the rich, the middle class, and the poor. Initially, economic development and
inequality are both driven by the accumulation of physical capital because the rich are
able to save more due to subsistence consumption needs and lower incomes of the other two
social classes. During this stage of economic development, which we call the neoclassical
regime, investments in higher education are not yet widespread because higher education
for the children is seen as a luxury good from the perspective of households. However, at
some point in time an income threshold is surpassed, above which the rich start to invest
in higher education of their children and correspondingly they reduce the savings rate and
therefore the accumulation of wealth (physical capital accumulation). In the aftermath of
the regime switch to the high-skill regime , income inequality and inheritance flows decline
because high-skilled human capital accumulation of the children is costly for the parents,
while the children do not yet supply their skills on the labor market. This phase lasts
for around one generation. Afterwards income inequality rises again because the better
educated children of the rich earn higher incomes, are thus able to bequeath more wealth
to their offspring and are also able to invest more in their children’s education than the
less well educated children of the middle class and the poor. Subsequently, also the income
levels of the middle class and potentially also those of the poor surpass the threshold levels
above which investments in their children’s higher education becomes a utility-maximizing
strategy.
This mechanism gives rise to a candidate explanation of the observed U-shaped evolu-
tion of income inequality and inheritance flows. In contrast to Piketty (2014), however, we
argue that the top income share does not approach 1 in the long-run. If all social classes
manage to transit to the high-skill regime, the growth rates of human capital converge
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between the rich, the middle class, and the poor in the long run, such that inequality
declines again and the top income share settles at a level substantially below 1. Crucial
for the emergence of declining inequality, though, is that all social classes switch to the
high-skill regime. As we show, this is by no means guaranteed because the poor essentially
face a risk of being disconnected from the growth process.
The following articles are closely related conceptually and/or content-wise. Galor and
Moav (2006) analyze the historical demise of the capitalist-worker class structure in an
overlapping generations model with intergenerational transfers and public education. They
show that the increasing importance of human capital in production after the Industrial
Revolution led to a cooperation between capitalists and workers in the sense that capi-
talists started to support public education for the masses. The central reason for doing
so is the complementarity between skills and physical capital in the sense that a better
educated workforce raises the rate of return on physical capital. In a related paper, Galor
et al. (2009) show how inequality in landownership adversely affected the emergence of
institutions that promote basic education during the Industrial Revolution. The reason
is that, due to a lower degree of complementarity between human capital and land (as
compared to human capital and physical capital), landowners are interested in a reduction
of the mobility of rural workers who might otherwise move to cities and work in factories.
Consequently, they oppose mass education. In countries, where landownership is very
unequal, the theory of Galor et al. (2009) implies that the adverse effect of education on
landowners is very strong such that they have a stronger incentive to oppose mass edu-
cation. Altogether, and consistent with the empirical evidence, countries with a higher
inequality in landownership got surpassed by countries with a lower degree of inequality
in landownership during the process of industrialization. These frameworks successfully
explain patterns in the emergence of publicly funded basic education for the masses and
the connection between education and inequality from a historical perspective. Galor and
Zeira (1993) show that initial wealth disparities matter for the long-run distribution of
incomes if capital markets are imperfect and there are indivisibilities in education invest-
ments. In so doing they add another explanation for the emergence of a Kuznets curve,
i.e., increasing inequality first and then decreasing inequality in the course of economic
development. In contrast to these papers, we are more concerned with the connection
between higher education, which gained importance in the second half of the 20th Cen-
tury, and the patterns of inequality after World War II. We therefore focus on the next
phase of increasing inequality throughout the period 1980-2010 and also show that, under
certain circumstances, inequality might decline again in the future.2 Related to the recent
increase in inequality, Bo¨hm et al. (2015) develop a very interesting endogenous directed
technical change model to analyze the extent to which low-skilled workers benefit from
trickle-down effects of public education policies that are targeted toward the high-skilled
2In an interesting article, Galor and Tsiddon (1997) focus on a different question and investigate the in-
teractions between technological inventions and inequality. They show that periods with a lot of inventions
go hand in hand with high inequality but also high intergenerational mobility, while periods of innovations
are associated with lower inequality but also with lower intergenerational mobility.
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workers. They show that such policies reduce the wages of low-skilled workers and raise
inequality in the short run, while they are beneficial to low-skilled workers in the long
run. While Bo¨hm et al. (2015) consider an exogenous distribution of skilled and unskilled
households, in our setting the switch from the neoclassical regime to investments in higher
education and thus the distribution of skills is endogenous. Moreover, this regime switch
is the central mechanism behind the U-shaped evolution of inequality over time. Finally,
by construction, Bo¨hm et al. (2015) focus on the episode of increasing inequality, while
our paper addresses the whole U-shaped pattern in the joint evolution of inequality and
inheritances. For the sake of clarity, however, we switch off the channel of skill-biased
technical change.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 analyzes the
dynamics, Section 4 illustrates the model solution by means of a numerical example, and
Section 5 concludes and describes potential policy measures to reduce income inequality
and its negative economic effects.
2 The model
We follow the standard strategy to illustrate a particular mechanism by deliberately
switching off the other potential explanations for the evolution of income inequality and
inheritance flows. The advantage of doing so is that the effect of higher education is not
obscured by other influences. Of course, this does not imply that we believe that our
mechanism is able to explain the whole pattern.
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of individuals belonging to
overlapping generations. Time is discrete, indexed by t, and ranges from 0 to ∞. A large
number of firms produce aggregate output Yt with physical capital Kt and human capital
HY,t using a constant returns to scale technology of the Cobb-Douglas type
Yt = AK
α
t H
1−α
Y,t , (1)
with A > 0 being total factor productivity (TFP) and α ∈ (0, 1) denoting the elasticity
of output with respect to physical capital. Perfect competition implies that equilibrium
rates of reward are given by
wt = (1− α)Ak
α
t , rt + 1 = αAk
α−1
t , (2)
where kt = Kt/HY,t represents physical capital per unit of effective labor and there is
full depreciation of physical capital over the course of one generation. Moreover, the
interest rate is determined at the world capital market such that rt = r¯ = const. and
r + 1 ≡ R = αAkα−1, implying an equilibrium capital stock per unit of effective labor of
k =
(
αA
R
) 1
1−α
= const. (3)
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This in turn implies that the wage rate per unit of effective labor is constant and given by
wt = w = (1− α)A
(
αA
R
) α
1−α
= const. (4)
Each member of generation t belongs to one out of three social classes that are indexed
by j = r,m, p: the rich are referred to by r, the middle class by m, and the poor by p.
The life-cycle of each individual consists of three distinct phases: childhood, adulthood,
and retirement. Adults are endowed with one unit of time and hj,t units of human capital.
They work, consume the amount cj,t, give birth to n > 0 children, and potentially provide
each child with ej,t ≥ 0 units of higher education. Moreover, adults save the amount sj,t
to cover their own consumption needs in their last period of life, cj,t+1, and to bequeath
the amount nbj,t+1 to their offspring.
We describe the lifetime utility of agent j, who was born in t− 1, by using the utility
function
uj,t = log(cj,t − c¯) + γ log(hj,t+1) + β [log(cj,t+1) + θ log(bj,t+1)] , (5)
where c¯ > 0 is the subsistence level of consumption, β ∈ (0, 1) represents the discount
factor, hj,t+1 refers to the level of human capital per child, γ > 0 denotes the utility weight
that parents attach to the human capital level of their children, and θ ∈ (0, 1) represents
the utility weight of the bequests to each child. As usual, the log-linear specification
assures analytical tractability. Note that our utility function is less restrictive than the
standard specification because, due to the presence of c¯ > 0, it allows the savings rate to
depend on incomes. Population growth is treated as exogenous because we do not aim
to analyze the quality-quantity trade-off, the demographic transition, and the take-off to
long-run economic growth.3 Instead, we assume that the economy already escaped the
Malthusian stagnation in the past and is now industrialized. In the words of Hansen and
Prescott (2002), the transition from Malthus to Solow has already occurred. What we
are concerned with is the next transition from a physical capital based economy to an
economy in which economic growth is primarily driven by human capital accumulation.
To put it differently, we are interested in the transition from Solow to Lucas (1988).
Higher education is financed by parents and provided by a schooling sector that em-
ploys lecturers, readers, and professors who are members of the middle class. For brevity
we refer to them simply as lecturers from now on. Altogether, human capital evolves
3For an appropriate treatment of the historical take-off toward sustained economic growth see the
Unified Growth Theory, in particular, Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002),
Galor and Moav (2002, 2006), Doepke (2004), Cervellati and Sunde (2005), Strulik and Weisdorf (2008),
Strulik et al. (2013), and Strulik (2014). See Galor (2005, 2011) for detailed overviews of the literature
and extensions to the baseline frameworks.
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according to
hhj,t+1 = (e¯j + ej,t)κh
h
m,t if ej,t > 0, (6)
hnj,t+1 = e¯j , if ej,t = 0, (7)
where κ is the productivity of the education sector and e¯j represents the baseline level of
education that each child of each group j obtains, for example, by observing her parents
and peers (see, for example, Strulik et al., 2013) or because it is provided costlessly by
the community in the form of public schooling.4 We treat e¯j as exogenous for the sake of
analytical clarity. Public schooling can easily be endogenized by income taxes, such that
the tax-financed level of e¯j would just depend on the structural parameters of our model
(see de la Croix and Doepke, 2004, for more details). It is straightforward to assume that
e¯r ≥ e¯m ≥ e¯p, i.e., that the rich do not acquire less baseline education than the middle
class, which in turn does not acquire less baseline education than the poor.
If ej,t > 0, the corresponding social class is in the high-skill regime as indicated by
the superscript l = h and otherwise it is in the neoclassical regime as indicated by the
superscript l = n.5 Consequently, the budget constraints for adults and retirees are given
by
I lj,t =
{
chj,t + s
h
j,t + wh
h
m,tne
h
j,t, if ej,t > 0,
cnj,t + s
n
j,t, if ej,t = 0,
(8)
slj,t =
clj,t+1 + nb
l
j,t+1
R
, (9)
with income being denoted by I lj,t = wh
l
j,t(1 − zn) + Rb
l
j,t, where z ∈ (0, 1) is the time
share necessary to raise one child to adulthood.6 Note that the term Rblj,t refers to the
bequests (plus interest payments) that a member of the cohort born in t− 1 gets from her
parents.
4Note that our formulation is a special case of de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) and Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992): hj,t+1 = (e¯j + ej,t)
ηhνj,th¯
1−ν
j,t , where h¯j,t denotes average human capital, ν the
intergenerational transmission of human capital, and η the impact of education on human capital. From
a conceptual point of view, the presence of average human capital can also be interpreted as a spillover
effect which is sizable according to recent findings (see Choi, 2011). We set η = 1 and ν = 0 for notational
convenience without affecting the generality of our results. Moreover, we allow the productivity of the
education sector, κ, to differ from 1.
5To reduce the complexity in the notation, we omit the superscript whenever this is possible.
6Recall that lecturers are recruited from the middle class, such that the costs for higher education
depend on hhm,t.
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The following lemma summarizes households’ optimal decisions.
Lemma 1.
(i) If l = n, agents maximize (5) subject to (8) and (9), such that
cnj,t =
Inj,t + [(1 + θ)β]c¯
1 + (1 + θ)β
, (10)
cnj,t+1 =
β
1 + (1 + θ)β
[Inj,t − c¯]R, (11)
bnj,t+1 =
θβ
n[1 + (1 + θ)β]
[Inj,t − c¯]R, (12)
with ej,t = 0 implying that h
n
j,t+1 is constant according to (7).
(ii) If l = h, agents maximize (5) subject to (8), (9), and (6), such that
chj,t =
Ihj,t + [γ + (1 + θ)β]c¯+ wh
h
m,tne¯j
1 + γ + (1 + θ)β
, (13)
chj,t+1 =
β
1 + γ + (1 + θ)β
[Ihj,t − c¯+ wh
h
m,tne¯j ]R, (14)
bhj,t+1 =
θβ
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
[Ihj,t − c¯+ wh
h
m,tne¯j ]R, (15)
ehj,t =
γ
whhm,tn[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
(Ihj,t − c¯)−
[1 + (1 + θ)β]e¯j
1 + γ + (1 + θ)β
, (16)
with hhj,t+1 evolving according to (6).
We observe from Lemma 1 that, ceteris paribus, consumption and bequests increase
with income (Ij,t); bequests decrease with population growth (n); and second period con-
sumption and bequests increase with the discount factor (β) and with the interest rate
(R), whereas they decrease with the subsistence consumption level (c¯). The existence
of c¯ > 0 implies a hierarchy of needs for households: expenditure shares for first period
consumption are declining with income, while expenditure shares on second period con-
sumption and on bequests are increasing with income. Hence, richer households save more
and bequeath more wealth to their children, which is a well-known fact and which is the
driver of inequality in the neoclassical regime.
In the high-skill regime, educational investments are positive and decrease with the
preference for bequests (θ), population growth (n), the discount factor (β), the subsistence
consumption level (c¯), and the baseline education level (e¯), whereas they increase with the
preference for education (γ). Moreover, in light of (16), we observe that the regime switch
from the neoclassical to the high-skill regime occurs if and only if the level of income, I lj,t,
is sufficiently high. This is expressed formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
A member of social class j = r,m, p invests in eduction, i.e., ej,t > 0, if her income
9
exceeds the critical threshold I ′j,t defined as
I ′j,t =
whhm,tne¯j
γ
[1 + (1 + θ)β] + c¯. (17)
Hence, ej,t = 0 if I
n
j,t ≤ I
′
j,t.
Regarding the critical level of income that induces the regime switch to the high-skill
regime, several remarks are in order. (1) The threshold level of income necessary to induce
the regime switch depends positively on the level of subsistence consumption, c¯, positively
on the sum of the weights of first and second period consumption, 1 + β, as well as on
the weight of bequests, θβ. A higher preference for education, γ, reduces in turn the
critical income level. Moreover, I ′j,t is increasing in the level of baseline education, e¯j ,
and education cost, whhm,tn. (2) In light of Proposition 1, the high-skill regime applies
to households of class j if their income level is sufficiently high such that investments in
education above the basic level (that can be acquired costlessly) deliver a higher amount
of additional utility as using the same amount of income for consumption and bequests. In
this case we have Ij,t > I
′
j,t, such that ej,t > 0. The optimal solutions are then described
by item (ii) of Lemma 1. If the income level of households in social class j falls short of a
critical threshold I ′j,t, these households find it optimal not to invest in education of their
children because the children acquire a certain amount of human capital costlessly and
the additional investments in human capital would deliver less additional utility than if
the same amount of income was instead spent on consumption or was bequeathed. These
households find themselves in the neoclassical regime, i.e., l = n and ej,t = 0, such that
their optimal decisions are described by item (i) of Lemma 1.7 (3) As long as the middle
class does not switch to the high-skill regime, I ′j,t is constant. If the middle class starts to
invest in higher education of their children, I ′j,t is growing with the growth rate of ht,m.
If, furthermore, the middle class switches before the poor and after the rich, the described
mechanism becomes crucial for the poor because they are at risk that I ′p,t is growing faster
than their incomes such that a regime switch of the poor would not occur without policy
interventions in terms of publicly financed universities and/or higher education subsidies
such as stipends. (4) In case of e¯r = e¯m = e¯p, it follows that all social classes exhibit
the same threshold of income but that social classes switch at different dates depending
on the distribution of wealth. Thus, even without any differences in the level of basic
education among the social classes, there is a risk that the poor will be disconnected from
the growth process in the sense that their incomes are lagging behind their critical income
level I ′p,t. In case of e¯r > e¯m > e¯p, it follows that I
′
r,t > I
′
m,t > I
′
p,t. This effect is, however,
compensated because the rich attain a higher level of wealth and a higher accumulation
rate of wealth, such that they reach their threshold level before the middle class, which in
turn reaches its threshold level before the poor.
7See also Solow (1956), Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965), and Diamond (1965) for the
analysis of capital accumulation in a neoclassical setting without human capital accumulation. The last
reference is closest to our framework because of its discrete time overlapping generations formulation.
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Taking into account the time required for child-care (zn), each social class supplies
Lj,t = (1− zn)Nj,t (18)
units of of raw labor, where Nj,t is the number of individuals who belong to social class j.
Thus, the aggregate supply of human capital can be obtained as the sum of human capital
within each social class, which is in turn given by the product of class-specific labor supply
(Lj,t) and average class-specific human capital (hj,t):
Ht = hr,tLr,t + hm,tLm,t + hp,tLp,t. (19)
Consequently, aggregate supply of human capital allocated to production is obtained as
HY,t =
{
Ht − (er,tNr,t + em,tNm,t + ep,tNp,t)hm,tLm,t, if l = h,
Ht, if l = n.
(20)
This takes into account that human capital used for production is equal to total available
human capital net of the human capital that is employed in the higher education sector,
which is recruited from the middle class.
3 Dynamics
3.1 Neoclassical regime
In light of Proposition 1, the neoclassical regime is characterized by Ij,t ≤ I
′
j,t, such that
ej,t = 0. Consequently, the level of human capital is constant and equal to the level of
baseline education, i.e., hnj,t+1 = e¯j . Thus, income of a member of social class j is given
by
Inj,t = we¯j(1− zn) +Rb
n
j,t. (21)
In the following, we denote stationary variables with an asterisk in the subscript. Given
that labor incomes are stationary in the neoclassical regime, the accumulation of wealth
via bequests is the only source of income growth. Income, Inj,∗ = we¯j(1−zn)+Rb
n
j,∗, is thus
constant when bequests approach their steady-state level, bnj,∗. This implies that a regime
switch from the neoclassical regime to the high-skill regime can only occur if the threshold
levels of income that are compatible with the regime switch are below their steady-state
levels, i.e., a necessary condition for the regime switch is Inj,∗ > I
′
j,t.
8 The following
proposition specifies this aspect in more detail. A graphical illustration is presented in
Figure 2.
8Note that this would even be the case in the presence of productivity growth fueled by other sources
than human capital accumulation (e.g., by technological progress) because disposable incomes and the
threshold level I ′j,t are growing at the same rate.
11
Proposition 2.
(i) According to (12) and (21), the accumulation of wealth within social class j is gov-
erned by
bnj,t+1 =
θβ
n[1 + (1 + θ)β]
[we¯j(1− zn) +Rb
n
j,t − c¯]R (22)
with a unique and stable steady state at
bnj,∗ =
θβR
n[1 + (1 + θ)β]− θβR2
[(1− zn)we¯j − c¯], (23)
given that θβR2 < n[1 + (1 + θ)β].
(ii) The regime switch requires Ij,∗ = (1 − zn)we¯j + Rbj,∗ > I
′
j,t, which implies in light
of (21) and (23) that
bnj,∗ >
whm,tne¯j
γR
[1 + (1 + θ)β] +
c¯
R
−
(1− zn)we¯j
R
(24)
and
e¯j > eˆ
h ≡
γc¯
{γ(1− zn)w − whhm,t[n(1 + (1 + θ)β)− θβR
2]}
(25)
if l = h, and
e¯j > eˆ
n ≡
γc¯
{γ(1− zn)w − we¯m[n(1 + (1 + θ)β)− θβR2]}
(26)
if l = n.
With regard to item (i) in Proposition 2, labor income must exceed the level of sub-
sistence consumption, i.e., (1 − zn)we¯j > c¯, otherwise the steady state is economically
meaningless. Moreover, global stability of bnj,∗ requires that θβR
2 < n[1 + (1 + θ)β].9 In
addition, note that the location of the bnj -locus as defined by (22) depends positively on
e¯j . If e¯r > e¯m > e¯p, it follows that b
n
r,∗ > b
n
m,∗ > b
n
p,∗.
A transition into the high-skill regime [item (ii)] requires that the long-run value of
bequests in social class j as given by bnj,∗ is larger than the threshold level of wealth b
′
j,t
that is associated with the threshold level of income I ′j,t. This is only possible if e¯j > eˆ.
From item (i), we know that a feasible and globally stable steady state, bnj,∗ > 0, requires
that n[1 + (1 + θ)β] − θβR2 > 0. As γc¯ > 0 and e¯j > 0, (25) and (26) hold only if
γ(1− zn)w > {n[1 + (1 + θ)β]− θβR2}. If the middle class is in the neoclassical regime,
the poor need a minimum e¯p > eˆ
n, otherwise their steady-state income falls short of their
threshold income. In case that the middle class already experienced a regime switch, costs
9For (1− zn)we¯j < c¯, a steady state exists only if θβR
2 > n[1 + (1 + θ)β], which implies, in turn, that
bnj,∗ is globally unstable.
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Figure 2: Neoclassical regime, with e¯r > e¯m > e¯p.
of higher education are increasing such that the threshold level of income necessary to
conduct the regime switch is also increasing. Unless the baseline level of education of the
poor fulfills (25) the regime switch is still possible.
If e¯j ≤ eˆ
l, accumulated assets of social class j sustained by the neoclassical regime fall
short of I ′j,t such that a switch to the high-skill regime cannot occur for social class j. If
eˆn > e¯r, no social class would ever invest in higher education of their children. In this
case the economy is trapped in the neoclassical regime as described by the Solow (1956)
model and growth would cease at a certain point. This could be a relevant description
of the “middle income trap”, i.e., that countries, which successfully escaped the phase of
stagnation at the subsistence level, cannot manage to switch to an innovation-based high-
skill economy (cf. Eichengreen et al., 2012, 2013, who observe, among other things, that
middle income traps are less likely to be an obstacle for countries with a well educated
population). By contrast, a switch of all social classes to the growth regime is guaranteed
for e¯p > eˆ
l.
3.2 High-skill regime
In the high-skill regime, income of social class j exceeds I ′j,t, such that these parents invest
in higher education of their children. Their optimal decisions are represented by item
(ii) of Lemma 1 and the evolution of human capital in social class j is then governed
by (6). We summarize the dynamic behavior in the high-skill regime in the subsequent
proposition.
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Proposition 3.
(i) In the high-skill regime, the evolution of human capital and bequests is governed by
the following system of difference equations
hhj,t+1 = (e¯j + ej,t)κh
h
m,t, (27)
bhj,t+1 =
θβ
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
[whhj,t(1− zn) +Rb
h
j,t − c¯+ wh
h
m,tne¯j ]R. (28)
(ii) The ratio between bequests and human capital is constant and the same for all social
classes that switched to the high-skill regime, i.e.,
bhj,t+1
hj,t+1
=
wθβR
γκ
= const. (29)
(iii) Let xhj,t denote the ratio of human capital between social class j and the middle class,
i.e., xhj,t = h
h
j,t/h¯
h
m,t, such that
xhj,t+1 =
ej,t + e¯j
em,t + e¯m
=
[
(1− zn) + θβR
2
γ
]
xhj,t −
c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯jn
(1− zn) + θβR
2
γ
− c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯mn
. (30)
The stationary solution is given by
xhj,∗ = lim
t→∞
xj,t+1 = e¯j/e¯m, (31)
with xhj,∗ T 1, if e¯j T e¯m.
(iv) The gross growth rate of human capital is given by
hhj,t+1
hhj,t
= (e¯j + ej,t)
hhm,t
hhj,t
=
γκ
[
(1− zn) +
Rbhj,t
hhj,t
− c¯
whhj,t
+
ne¯j
xhj,t
]
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
(32)
=
γκ
[
(1− zn) + θβR
2
γ
− c¯
whhj,t
+
ne¯j
xhj,t
]
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
. (33)
In the long-run it converges to
lim
t→∞
hhj,t+1
hhj,t
=
γκ(1− zn+ e¯mn) + θβR
2
n[1 + γ + β(1 + θ)]
. (34)
The regime switch to the high-skill regime induces growing wage incomes, whhj,t, and
increasing levels of bequests [item (i) of Proposition 3], such that total incomes, Ihj,t, grow
as well. After the regime switch, the ratio between bequests and human capital is constant
and the same for all social classes [item (ii)], such that incomes grow at the same rate.
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The ratio of bequests to human capital, bhj,t+1/hj,t+1, declines with the weight of children’s
education in the parental utility function, γ, and the productivity of the education sector,
κ. On the other hand, it increases with the arguments responsible for an increase in
bequests, i.e., wages, w, which also increase education costs, the weight of bequests in the
parental utility function, θβ, and the interest factor, R.
Inequality is determined by the initial distribution of wealth and by different levels of
baseline education, e¯j . In item (iii), we capture the evolution of inequality in terms of
education by the dynamics of the ratio between human capital of social class j and the
level of human capital of the middle class, i.e., xj,t = h
h
j,t/h
h
m,t. As regards the evolution
of relative human capital, the cases of different or equal levels of baseline education, e¯j ,
should be distinguished. (1) If social classes do not differ with respect to their baseline
levels of education such that e¯r = e¯m = e¯p, it follows in light of (30) that the influence
of subsistence consumption on the evolution of xj,t is approaching zero in the long run
(limt→∞ c¯/wh
h
j,t = 0). Thus, xj,t converges to 1 as t approaches infinity if there are
no differences in the baseline levels of education. Item (ii) implies that all social classes
bequeath the same amount of assets to their children, such that incomes are equal between
social classes in the long run. Thus, there is only scope for long-run inequality if not all
social classes switch to the high-skill regime. Transitory inequality is determined by the
initial distribution of wealth for a given constellation of I ′j,t < I
n
j,∗ determining the timing
of the regime switch in social class j. Note, in this context, that the transition phase lasts
for a very long time period (several generations) such that inequality could be observed
for centuries if such a model represents the underlying data generating process. (2) If, in
turn, e¯j ≷ e¯m, it follows that xj approaches e¯j/e¯m ≷ 1 if e¯j ≷ e¯m. Thus, differences in the
level of baseline education translate into differences in relative human capital endowments,
differences in the levels of bequests, and differences in the levels of income. A constant
b/h− ratio implies then that households with lower human capital endowments exhibit
also lower bequests, even in the long run.
The growth rate of human capital [item (iv)] depends positively on the b/h−ratio,
positively on time devoted to work, and positively on γ/{n[1+γ+(1+θ)β]}, which drives
the expenditure share of higher education. Moreover, the growth rate of human capital
is positively affected by the baseline level of education, e¯j , and the productivity of the
education sector, κ. During the transition, the growth rate of human capital is adversely
affected by subsistence needs, c¯, and by xhj,t. The latter reflects a neoclassical convergence
mechanism. In the long run, due to increasing wage incomes, the impact of subsistence
needs on the evolution of human capital approaches zero. Altogether, xj,t converges to
e¯j/e¯m, such that the growth factor of human capital converges to expression (34).
Crucial for our theory is the emergence of declining and then increasing inequality
after the regime switch from the neoclassical to the high-skill regime. The main argument
is summarized in the following proposition. The possible decline in inequality in a later
phase of the high-skill regime will be discussed further below.
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Figure 3: Regime switch to the high-skill regime
Proposition 4. A social class that reaches the critical income level I ′j,t reduces the accu-
mulation of wealth.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows: At the moment of the regime switch,
a member of social class j is equipped with a wealth level of at least b′j,t, which just
assures the necessary level of income that generates the regime switch (I ′j,t, as defined by
Proposition 1). In the neoclassical regime, according to Lemma 1, an income level of I0j,t
induces a level of bequests of
bnj,t+1 =
θβR
n[1 + (1 + θ)β]
[I0j,t − c¯]. (35)
In the high-skill regime the level of bequests is given by
bhj,t+1 =
θβR
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
[I0j,t − c¯+ wth¯
h
t ne¯j ]. (36)
From the last two expressions, we obtain bnj,t+1 > b
h
j,t+1 if
I0j,t > [1 + (1 + θ)β]
whhm,tne¯j
γ
+ c¯, (37)
which, in light of Proposition 1, implies that I0j,t > I
′
j,t. Thus, a household switching to the
high-skill regime starts to invest in higher education of the children but at the expense of
bequests per child. To put it differently, households shift resources from the accumulation
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of wealth in the form of physical capital to the accumulation of human capital. The rich
are the first social class that experiences the regime switch and reduces bequests, followed
by the middle class and possibly also the poor. Given that the expenditure share of
bequests is, due to the existence of subsistence needs, increasing with income, the decline
in bequeathed assets in the highest income percentiles may be outperformed by increasing
levels of bequests in the other social classes, such that inequality falls. As labor incomes
of the children of the rich are increasing because of human capital accumulation (which, in
turn, stimulates increasing levels of bequests and education), inequality may start to rise
again. Altogether, income inequality follows the U-shaped pattern of the “Piketty-curve”
as described above.
A graphical illustration of our arguments is presented in Figure 3. The evolution of
bequests follows the arrows A, B, and C. In period t, members of social class j exhibit
a level of assets indicated by b0j,t, which exceeds b
′
j,t associated with the threshold income
I ′j,t. Thus, social class j switches to the high-skill regime and leaves the b
n
j,t+1-locus. From
Proposition 4 it follows that the bhj,t+1-locus compatible with b
0
j,t must be located below the
bnj,t+1-locus, such that the level of bequests shrinks (B). Since the evolution of social class
j is now described by Proposition 3, item (i), the bhj,t+1-locus moves upwards such that
bequests increase again (C).10 Obviously, the speed of the upward shift depends (ceteris
paribus) on the quality of the education sector reflected by the education productivity
parameter κ. Thus, κ also affects the evolution of inequality.
Regarding the evolution of inequality after the regime switch it is important to note
that the discussed fall and rise in inequality is just a transitory phenomenon. Relative
human capital stocks will converge to their initial values and inequality will decline toward
its long-run value. Nevertheless, and this will be clarified further below, the emergence
of declining inequality and its potential amount depends crucially on whether or not all
social groups experience a regime switch to the high-skill regime. In light of Lemma 1,
expenditures for higher education are zero in the neoclassical regime, such that we obtain
from Proposition 3, item (iii), initial relative human capital endowments in the neoclassical
regime as
xnr,t =
e¯r
e¯m
> 1, xnm,t = 1, x
n
p,t =
e¯p
e¯m
< 1, (38)
which are equal to the corresponding long-run values in the high-skill regime, xhj,∗ [see
(31)]. Due to a higher level of wealth and a higher convergence speed, the rich surpass
their critical threshold income first, followed by the middle class and possibly also by the
poor. Higher education in the rich population group can be expressed as
er,t =
γ
n[1 + γ(1 + θ)β]
[
(1− zn) +
R2θβ
γ
]
xhr,t −
c¯
whm,t
−
[1 + (1 + θ)β]e¯r
1 + γ(1 + θ)β
. (39)
10This behavior is consistent with data discussed by Piketty and Zucman (2015), see also the discussion
in the Introduction.
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With hm,t being constant, x
h
r,t increases after the regime switch of the rich above x
n
r,t
and induces increasing expenditures on eduction, which amplifies the income gap to the
other social classes later on. After the middle class experiences a regime switch, the
resulting increase in hm,t affects relative endowments of the other social groups, while xm,t
remains at 1. If the poor are still not investing in higher education, their relative human
capital stock shrinks and falls short of xnp,t. Moreover, their threshold income (I
′
p,t) is
now increasing with the growth rate of human capital in the middle class. If, under these
circumstances, I ′p,t is increasing above I
n
p,∗, the poor will never switch (or they may just
temporarily switch) to the high-skill regime given that the growth rate of their incomes is
below the growth rate of I ′p,t.
Initially, er,t increases because of the increase in x
h
r,t, indicating that education is
comparatively cheap for the rich. When the middle class starts to invest in education,
there is a dampening effect on xr,t because of the increase in education costs due to
the increase in hm,t, but a second reinforcing effect on education setting in through the
diminishing role of subsistence needs, c¯/(whm,t). The latter, however, is only a transitory
effect that becomes smaller and smaller as the middle class accumulates human capital.
Thus, the rich reduce the growth rate of expenditures on eduction below the level of the
middle class such that xhr,t converges from above to its long-run value x
h
r,∗ = x
n
r,t. A
symmetric argument holds for the poor. The regime switch of the middle class adversely
affects the poor’s relative human capital stock, xp,t. Thus, their expenditures fall short of
the level achieved in the middle class and xhp,t shrinks below x
n
p,t. However, the declining
importance of subsistence needs dampens the decline over time, which implies that the
growth in expenditures on education in the middle class ceases to the extent that xhp,t
adjusts from below to its long-run value xhp,∗ = x
n
p,t. The convergence of relative human
capital stocks to their initial values is precisely the mechanism responsible for the decline
in inequality. But again, it is important to stress the feasibility of the regime switch
for the poor population group. Since the poor may start to invest in higher education
after the regime switch of the middle class has occurred, their threshold income may grow
faster than their actual incomes. Thus, the poor never (or only temporarily) switch to
the high-skill regime. In this case, their relative human capital shrinks toward zero and
the initial distribution of wealth will affect long-run inequality. In this context, the overall
amount of inequality may be a poor predictor for the feasibility of the regime switch for
all social classes. What matters is the income gap between the poor and the middle class.
A comparatively large distance between the poor and the middle class induces a relatively
early switch of the middle class to the high-skill regime, which is responsible for a relatively
fast growing threshold income of the poor.
The role of the quality of the education sector, as reflected by κ, is twofold. An
increase in κ increases labor incomes and bequests, such that the decline in bequests after
the regime switch will be reduced or even non-existent. Moreover, an increase in the
productivity of the education sector may disconnect the poor from the growth process
because of an increase in the growth rate of their threshold income. However, a reduction
18
in the quality of the education sector reduces inequality during the transition because of a
slow increase in labor incomes and bequests. But precisely the slower increase in incomes
may again reduce the growth rate of incomes of the poor below the growth rate of their
threshold incomes. Thus, for a given amount of inequality, there exists a certain range in
which the productivity of the education sector ensures that a regime switch occurs for all
social classes. We discuss and illustrate this argument in the next section in more detail.
4 Numerical experiments
In this section we conduct numerical experiments to illustrate the theoretical results form
the previous sections. Specifically, we analyze the effects of different amounts of initial
inequality in wealth on the evolution of inequality over time.
We choose the parameters of the model such that the balanced growth path fits to
empirical observations of developed economies. We fix the capital income share in the
production of output, α, at 0.3. In our model, one period has a length of thirty years. The
real interest rate is set to 4% per year, i.e., R = 1.0430. The literature on business cycles
suggests a discount factor of future consumption of around 0.99 per quarter, such that
β = 0.99120. The long-run projections of the United Nations suggest a stationary world
population, such that we set n = 1. As regards child-rearing time, we fix the time share
necessary to raise one child to adulthood, z, at 0.027, which implies an opportunity cost of
around 15% of parents’ time endowment per child. Moreover, the weight of human capital
in the parental utility function, γ, is set to 0.278.11 The remaining values are calibrated
in an iterative way assuring long-run human capital growth (per year) between one and
two percent and expenditures on education not exceeding 6%. Altogether, this implies
A = 10, κ = 3.3, θ = 0.4, c¯ = 1.8, e¯r = 0.28, e¯m = 0.27, and e¯p = 0.26.
In Figure 4, we depict the evolution of bequests [(a), (c), and (d)] and education [(b),
(d), and (f)] in social class j for different amounts of initial inequality in the distribution
of wealth (solid lines). In Figure 5 (solid lines), we depict the corresponding evolution
of inequality as expressed by the income share of the rich and the evolution of relative
human capital stocks governed by Equation (30). In both figures, the dashed lines show
the hypothetical transition if the corresponding social class would not have switched to
the high-skill regime. Scenario (a), (b) is characterized by a comparatively equal initial
distribution of wealth, while the Scenarios (c), (d) and (e), (f) exhibit not only a higher
amount of initial inequality in wealth, but also different distances between the middle
class and the poor. The latter is crucial for the likelihood that the poor conduct a regime
switch to the high-skill regime. Indeed, it may be misleading to assess the evolution of
the economy just by means of initial inequality.
Since e¯r > e¯m > e¯p, social classes transit along different trajectories toward different
steady states in the neoclassical regime (see Proposition 2 and Figure 2), in the sense that
bnr,∗ > b
n
m,∗ > b
n
p,∗. Moreover, Proposition 1 implies that the three social classes exhibit
11For further details on the evaluation of these values see de la Croix and Doepke (2003).
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Figure 4: Evolution of bequests (bj) and education (ej): (a), (b) low initial inequality;
(c), (d) high initial inequality; (e), (f) high inequality between middle class and poor.
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Figure 5: Incomes of the rich relative to total incomes (Ir,t/It) and relative human capital
endowments (xj).
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different threshold incomes: Iˆr > Iˆm > Iˆp. Due to a higher level of assets, the rich surpass
their threshold level of income first and start to invest in higher education of their children.
In the previous section, we argued that the regime switch to the high-skill regime induces a
reduction in bequests (see Proposition 4 and Figure 3). In Figures 4 (a), (c), and (e) we see
indeed that bequests of the rich fall short of the level in the neoclassical regime after the
regime switch. Nevertheless, increasing investments in education increase labor incomes in
subsequent periods such that the level of bequests increases again. Figures 4 (b), (d), and
(f) show the evolution of parental expenditures on education (ej,t). The rich are the first
to invest in eduction of their children, while the middle class and the poor exhibit constant
levels of human capital until they experience a regime switch as well. Thus, human capital
and incomes of the rich grow faster than in the other classes. Symmetrically, the poor
are the last social group to begin to invest in education. From this moment onwards, the
middle class and the education sector are characterized by growing levels of human capital,
which in turn induces increasing costs of higher education. Hence, from the perspective
of the poor, the regime switch goes hand in hand with shrinking bequests and increasing
costs of higher education, such that the education levels of the poor undershoot. This
is the mechanism responsible for the increase in inequality after the regime switch of the
poor. Moreover, comparing Figures 4 (a), (b) with (c), (d) shows that initial inequality
does not affect differences in education. However, comparing both scenarios with (e), (f)
demonstrates that the initial distribution affects the possibility of the regime switch of the
poor, i.e., what matters is the distance between the level of wealth of the poor and those
of the middle class. In the last scenario, inequality is initially even lower than in Scenario
(c), (d), but the poor are comparatively poorer and accumulate wealth at a lower rate than
the middle class due to subsistence consumption constraints. The middle class switches to
the high-skill regime, which induces a continuous increase in the poor’s threshold income
that exceeds the growth rate of their actual incomes. It follows that the poor never switch
to the high-skill regime.12
In light of Proposition 3, item (iii), relative human capital stocks converge to e¯j/e¯m
such that even the increase in inequality caused by the regime switch to the high-skill
regime is just a transitory phenomenon and inequality will fall to a level determined by
the differences in the levels of baseline education. We depict the evolution of inequality
expressed by the dynamics of the share of total income of the rich in Figure 5. Initially,
inequality is declining due to the forces of a neoclassical convergence mechanism.13 After
the regime switch to the high-skill regime, the income share of the rich drops below the
level of the neoclassical regime because of a decline in bequests. It starts to increase
again when the other social classes invest in education because their bequests are reduced,
12For moderate increases in the poor’s initial level of wealth, the poor may initially switch to the high-
skill regime but since their income growth cannot keep up with the growth rate of their threshold income,
I ′p,t overtakes their incomes and the poor switch back to the neoclassical regime. In this case bequests
converge from below to the neoclassical trajectory.
13Inequality shrinks if the rich are – compared to the other social classes – already close to their steady
state. Otherwise inequality would increase due to the forces to cover subsistence needs.
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Figure 6: Evolution of (a) bequests for the rich (br) and (b) the income share of the rich
(Ir,t/It) in response to changes in the productivity of the education sector, κ; black solid:
baseline calibration; red solid: κ reduced by 10%; black dotted: κ increased by 10%; red
dotted: κ increased by 20% relative to the baseline calibration.
while labor incomes and bequests of the rich are increasing again. After investments in
education of the rich have peaked, inequality starts to decline toward its steady-state
level. The evolution of inequality in later phases of the high-skill regime thus follows the
evolution of relative human capital endowments (see right-hand panel of Figure 5).
Higher initial inequality due to a wealthier rich class amplifies the time interval during
which the regime switches of the different social groups occurs such that the rich invest
earlier in education and exhibit earlier increasing levels of bequests. The income share
of the rich drops during the neoclassical regime from a higher level and increases due to
the described differences in educational attainments to a higher level again. Nevertheless,
differences in initial inequality do not affect the long-run income share of the rich. Long-
run income shares are only affected if at least one group does not switch to the high-skill
scenario. The long-run amount of inequality is then dependent on population shares of
the different social classes. In this respect, the amount of initial inequality is, as has
been stressed before, a poor predictor for long-run inequality. Indeed, Scenario (e), (f)
is characterized by lower initial but a higher long-run inequality compared to Scenario
(b), (c). What matters is not the overall amount of inequality but the distance between
the middle class and the poor. Even though initial inequality may be comparatively low,
the early switch of the middle class to the high-skill regime induces a fast growth rate of
the poor’s critical income level, such that their investments in education are equal to (or
approach) zero, which gives rise to a larger amount of long-run inequality.
In Figure 6, we illustrate the effect of variations in the quality of the education sector,
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κ, on the evolution of inequality. Panel (a) presents the evolution of bequests for the rich
and in panel (b) we depict the evolution of the income share of the rich. As becomes
apparent, the productivity of the education sector steers the magnitude of the decline in
inequality after the regime switch to the high-skill regime. The lower the productivity
of the education sector, the longer the period of time during which agents reduce their
bequests below the level of the neoclassical regime. Although it is a utility-maximizing
strategy to invest in higher education at the expense of bequests, a lower productivity of
the education sector implies a slower increase in wage incomes for subsequent generations.
This contributes to a stronger transitory decline in inequality. A relatively low κ (solid red
line) may be equally harmful for the poor as a relatively high κ. If κ is low, the reduction in
bequests and the slow increase in labor incomes may create a situation that is characterized
by a faster increase in the threshold income of the poor compared to their actual incomes,
such that the poor will cease to invest in higher education. Hence, inequality rises after
the regime switch of the middle class because the poor are disconnected from the high-skill
regime. As regards the long-run effects, this scenario is symmetric to the one characterized
by a relatively high productivity in the education sector (dotted red line). In the latter
scenario, the poor’s threshold income is increasing faster than their actual incomes right
from the beginning, such that the poor would not even invest in higher education during
the transition. Only for an intermediate range of κ, the regime switch of all social classes
is guaranteed. A moderate increase in the quality of the education sector (black dotted
line) reduces the decline in inequality after the regime switch and increases the peak of
inequality. However, after the peak inequality level is surpassed, inequality declines faster
toward its long-run value.
5 Conclusions
We set up a novel overlapping generations model with three social classes: the rich, the
middle class, and the poor. Initially, the economy is in the neoclassical regime in which
income growth is entirely driven by the accumulation of physical capital. During this
stage of economic development, investments in higher education are not widespread be-
cause higher education for the children is seen as a luxury good from the perspective of
households.
After a certain threshold level of income is surpassed, richer households start to invest
in higher education of their children. This, however, reduces their savings and therefore
their bequests, which reduces inequality for at least one generation. The corresponding
earlier onset of higher education and therefore faster human capital accumulation of the
children of the rich leads to an increase of their incomes. Subsequently, also the middle
class and possibly the poor start to accumulate human capital. Since different social
groups accumulate human capital at different rates, inequality starts to increase again.
This mechanism gives rise to a candidate explanation of the observed U-shaped evolution
of income inequality and inheritance flows. In contrast to Piketty (2014), however, we
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argue that the top income share does not approach 1 in the long-run. In the high-skill
regime, there is long-run convergence of the growth rates of human capital between the
rich, the middle class, and the poor, such that inequality declines again and the top income
share converges toward a level substantially below 1. Crucial for the emergence of declining
inequality, though, is that all social classes switch to the high-skill regime. Essentially, the
poor face a risk of being disconnected from the growth process. Regarding the feasibility
of a regime switch for the poor, the initial distribution of wealth is a poor predictor. What
matters is the distance between the poor and the middle class.
To focus on the higher education channel, we isolated it by deliberately abstracting
from other mechanisms that affect inequality such as the disruptions of World War II,
changing tax policies, declining population growth, skill-biased technological change, the
decline of unionization, and globalization. We believe that each of these channels have
contributed to the pattern of the development of inequality over the last century. Our aim
was merely to emphasize and formalize the role of higher education. Analyzing the rela-
tive importance of the mentioned mechanisms for the evolution of inequality for different
countries is a promising task for further research.
We also show that it is by no means guaranteed that a regime switch from a neoclassical
growth regime, in which income growth is driven by the accumulation of wealth, toward a
high-skill growth regime, in which income growth is driven by human capital accumulation,
takes place. A necessary condition for this to happen is that the threshold income level
above which the rich start to accumulate human capital is below their steady-state income
level in the neoclassical growth regime. If this is not the case, then a country might be
stuck in a middle income trap from which it cannot escape toward the high-skill regime
on its own. There is also an intermediate case in which one or more (but not all) classes
are able to surpass the threshold income level above which it becomes optimal to invest
in higher education.
A central policy implication of our framework to reduce inequality is to invest in public
universities or in education subsidies for the poor (e.g., stipends). The reason is that such
a policy reduces the costs of education for the corresponding social class and thereby
reduces the threshold level of income above which it becomes optimal to invest in higher
education. In general, a policy that raises education and thereby the human capital level
of the population might also be a potential solution for a country to escape the middle
income trap as indicated by the results of Eichengreen et al. (2013).
Finally, we want to mention that we abstracted from technological progress. Including
an exogenously growing stock of technologies or even endogenous technological progress
would leave, however, the substance of our framework unaffected because the threshold
levels of income that are necessary for a regime switch would grow with the rate of tech-
nological progress.
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Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Lemma 1
(1) Item (i):
If l = n, a member of social class j maximizes (5) subject to (8) and (9). The
associated first-order conditions read
1
cnj,t − c¯
= λ, (A.1)
β
cnj,t+1
=
λ
R
, (A.2)
θβ
bnj,t+1
=
λn
R
. (A.3)
Combining (A.1) with (A.2) and (A.1) with (A.3) yields
cnj,t+1 = βR(c
n
j,t − c¯), (A.4)
bnj,t+1 =
θ
n
cnj,t+1. (A.5)
Combining the last two expressions with the budget constraint gives item (i).
(2) Item (ii):
If l = h, agents maximize (5) subject to (8), (9), and (7). The associated first-order
conditions are given by (A.1)-(A.3) for l=h and
γ
ehj,t + e¯j
= whhm,tnλ. (A.6)
From the last expression and (A.1), we obtain
ehj,t =
γ
n
(chj,t − c¯)− e¯j . (A.7)
Combining the last expression with (A.4) and (A.5) verifies item (ii).
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A.2 Proposition 1
Noting (16), we obtain ehj,t ≤ 0, if
γIj,t
whhm,tn
≤ [1 + (1 + θ)β]e¯j +
c¯
whhm,tn
, (A.8)
⇒ I ′j,t =
whhm,tne¯j [1 + (1 + θ)β]
γ
+ c¯. (A.9)
A.3 Proposition 2
The regime switch requires Ij,∗ = (1 − zn)we¯j + Rbj,∗ > I
′
j,t, which implies in light of
Proposition 1 that
bnj,∗ >
whhm,tne¯j
γR
[1 + (1 + θ)β] +
c¯
R
−
(1− zn)we¯j
R
. (A.10)
Substituting now for bnj,∗ by using (23) yields
θβR2
n[1 + (1 + θ)β]− θβR2
[(1− zn)we¯j − c¯]
>
whhm,tne¯j
γ
[1 + (1 + θ)β] + c¯− (1− zn)we¯j . (A.11)
From the last expression, we obtain a minimum level of eˆl that assures a regime switch in
the future
eˆl =
γc¯
{γ(1− zn)w − whlm,t[n(1 + (1 + θ)β)− θβR
2]}
, (A.12)
such that
eˆh =
γc¯
{γ(1− zn)w − whhm,t[n(1 + (1 + θ)β)− θβR
2]}
, (A.13)
and
eˆn =
γc¯
{γ(1− zn)w − we¯m[n(1 + (1 + θ)β)− θβR2]}
. (A.14)
Obviously, eˆn is constant and a regime switch is possible if e¯j > eˆ
h.
If l = h it follows that eˆh is growing with hhm,t, thus moving the critical level of income
to the right, such that a regime switch of classes poorer than the middle class becomes
infeasible if the threshold level has become greater than their steady-state level of bequests.
Note also that eˆn and eˆh exhibit a vertical asymptote at
h˜m,t =
(1− zn)γ
n[1 + (1 + θ)β]− θβR2
. (A.15)
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A.4 Proposition 3
(i) The ratio between bequests and human capital is constant along the BGP.
Note that
e¯j + ej,t =
γ(Ihj,t − c¯+ wh
h
m,te¯jn)
whhm,tn[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
. (A.16)
Thus
hhj,t+1
hhj,t
= (e¯j + ej,t)κ
hhm,t
hj,t
=
γκ(Ihj,t − c¯+ wh
h
m,te¯jn)
whhj,tn[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
. (A.17)
Note further that
bhj,t+1
hhj,t
=
θβR
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
[
Ihj,t − c¯+ wh
h
m,tne¯j
hhj,t
]
(A.18)
⇒
bhj,t+1
hhj,t+1
=
hhj,t
hhj,t+1
θβR
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
[
Ihj,t − c¯+ wh
h
m,tne¯j
hhj,t
]
. (A.19)
Combining the last expression with (A.17) yields
bhj,t+1
hhj,t
=
wθβR
γκ
= const. (A.20)
(ii) The evolution of relative inequality. Noting that xhj,t = h
h
j,t/h
h
m,t, we obtain
xhj,t+1 =
e¯j + ej,t
e¯m + em,t
=
Ihj,t−c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯jn
Ihm,t−c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯mn
(A.21)
⇒ xhj,t+1 =
[
(1− zn) +
Rbhj,t
whhj,t
]
xhj,t −
c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯jn
(1− zn) +
Rbhm,t
whhm,t
− c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯mn
. (A.22)
Taking into account (A.20), we obtain
xhj,t+1 =
[
(1− zn) + θβR
2
γ
]
xhj,t −
c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯jn
(1− zn) + θβR
2
γ
− c¯
whhm,t
+ e¯mn
. (A.23)
As limt→∞
c¯
whhm,t
= 0, we obtain from the last expression that
xj,∗ = xj,t+1 = xj,t = 1 (A.24)
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if e¯j = e¯m and
xj,∗ = xj,t+1 = xj,t =
e¯j
e¯m
≷ 1 (A.25)
if e¯j ≷ e¯m.
(iii) The gross growth rate of human capital.
From (A.17) and the definition of households’ incomes, we obtain
hhj,t+1
hhj,t
=
γκ
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
[
(1− zn) +
Rbhj,t
whhj,t
−
c¯
whhj,t
+
e¯jn
xj,t
]
. (A.26)
Combining the last expression with (A.20), we obtain
hhj,t+1
hhj,t
=
γκ
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
[
(1− zn) +
θβR2
γ
−
c¯
whhj,t
+
e¯jn
xj,t
]
, (A.27)
such that, in light of (ii), the gross growth rate of human capital reads
lim
t→∞
hhj,t+1
hhj,t
=
γκ(1− zn+ e¯mn) + θβR
2
n[1 + γ + (1 + θ)β]
. (A.28)
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PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
ICT 
27-2011 Monnet Benoit, 
Patrick Gbakoua and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza  
ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO 
28-2011 Nadine Riedel, 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO 
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
 
IK 
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
    
42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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